1	THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
3	
4	NEW YORK LIFE CA NO. 14-74 S
5	INSURANCE COMPANY
6	Plaintiff
7	
8	vs PROVIDENCE, RI
9	
10	AUGUST 1, 2014
11	MASSIEL ORTIZ
12	JULIA KLAH
13	Defendant
14	
15	BEFORE: MAGISTRATE JUDGE PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN
16	
17	APPEARANCES:
18	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: BROOKS R. MAGRATTEN, ESQ.
19	Pierce Atwood LLP 72 Pine Street
20	5th Floor Providence, RI 02903
21	401-588-5113
22	FOR THE DEFENDANT: STEPHEN A. RODIO, ESQ. MICHELLE FELIX, ATTY.
23	Rodio & Brown 2139 Broad Street
24	Cranston, RI 02905 401-274-4040
25	

AUGUST 1, 2014

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. We are here in the matter of New York Life Insurance vs Massiel Ortiz and Julia Klah. This is Civil Action 14-74 S, and we are here this morning to hear argument on two motions. First we have plaintiff's motion for interpleader relief, which is ECF 14, and second plaintiff's motion for summary judgment directed towards defendant Massiel Ortiz's counterclaim. That is ECF number 16. Before we begin, would counsel enter your appearances, please, for the record?

MR. MAGRATTEN: Brooks Magratten for the plaintiff New York Life.

MR. RODIO: Stephen Rodio for Ms. Ortiz.

MS. FELIX: Michelle Felix for Ms. Ortiz.

THE COURT: All right. All right, Mr. Magratten, you are the plaintiff and the movant so I'll hear from you first.

MR. MAGRATTEN: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. MAGRATTEN: You know the circumstances behind the case are tragic indeed. It involves the death of a 22 year old young man who apparently was an accomplished musician in March of 2013, his body was discovered on fire in a Cranston cemetery, and approximately four

months before then he had purchased a \$450,000 life

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

insurance policy with New York Life. Following his death, local authorities contacted New York Life about the policy. New York Life was subpoenaed by the authorities, turned over documents related to the policy, and what followed then, I think about a month later, was a claim received by the primary beneficiary, Ms. Ortiz, and what followed then are really two investigations. One into Mr. Kaydea's death by -- and it appears that both the Cranston Police and Rhode Island Attorney General personnel were involved in that investigation. Second, because death arose within the contestability period under the policy New York Life did, as it normally does in those circumstances, begin a contestability investigation in which it requested medical records, pharmacy records, criminal records, to investigate the representations in the application. THE COURT: One question on that point, Mr. Magratten, my observation is that the only, of all the facts that have been presented by all the parties, the only dispute is whether the contestability investigation was routine and the defendant Ortiz has presented record references suggesting that the investigation became -- I can't remember the term that

it went from standard to extreme, non-standard.

MR. MAGRATTEN: Correct.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: But as I read the underlying facts, and I don't know if we can sort of kind of reach the point where this fact is undisputed, and obviously I'm going to hear from Ms. Ortiz's counsel on this, but it seemed as if it was a routine contestability investigation. That is the initial letter seems to be a very routine letter, but as the contestability investigation proceeded it became different from routine because of the unusual circumstances.

MR. MAGRATTEN: I think that's a fair characterization. I asked my client the same question that Mr. Rodio has raised, we're dealing here with death by strangulation, what does medical history have to do with this, and we're in a state where in order to rescind coverage you have to show that the misrepresentation was related in some fashion to the cause of death. That's not the case in every state, and what I've been informed by New York Life is when death does occur within a contestability period the standard operating procedure go out and start looking for these What became of interest particularly in the records. circumstances of this case was a suggestion by authorities that this death was gang related, and there is a question in the application requiring the applicant

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

to respond as to whether, in this case, he has been convicted of a crime, pled guilty of a crime, or whether there were any criminal charges then pending. Now for that reason they, New York Life requested, or tried to get criminal records from Providence Police and from Cranston Police pertaining to Mr. Kaydea. They were ultimately unsuccessful in getting all those records except they were informed by Cranston Police that Mr. Kaydea did have an arrest record. And it's not -- I think it would be an overstatement to say that medical records in this case would be completely irrelevant. And let's take the case, for example, that there are medical records out there which indicate that Mr. Kaydea has had a history of stab wounds, gunshot wounds, other physical conditions that might point to gang involvement, or criminal involvement. I have absolutely no basis in fact that to know that that is the case. I'm just spinning a hypothetical here as to why --THE COURT: Right. But at the outset of the investigation New York Life doesn't know what we know now and therefore -- and would it be correct that the letter that New York Life first sent, I think it was May 2nd, and the array of records that were reflected in that letter, are what would be done in any instance where the death occurs within the contestability period

as the first thing that happens.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. MAGRATTEN: Yes, yes, that's very much -THE COURT: So to that extent it's routine.

MR. MAGRATTEN: Standard operating procedure. Ι think the thrust of Ms. Ortiz objections to this motion seems -- she raises the defense of laches and she's concerned about the time lapse. And again I come back to what was going on during the period. New York Life made the request for medical records. There was difficulty on Ms. Ortiz's part responding because she had no legal relationship with the decedent. She was a girlfriend for a period of time and the mother of the child born out of that relationship but she engaged a law firm in Rhode Island different than the one currently engaged to help get the records. They were unable to provide the records, and this process went on all the way up through the fall towards the end of 2013, and during the same time New York Life was checking in routinely with authorities. Very significantly, I believe it was May or June of 2013, the authorities informed New York Life that in this case the family and the beneficiary are persons of interest in the investigation.

So going forward, New York Life's investigator would contact authorities every month, every two months, all

the way up through, I believe, early January 2014 to find out about the status of the investigation. They were always told the investigation was still ongoing. They were told it was very active. And no one can be ruled out.

THE COURT: Was Ms. Ortiz, or her counsel, put on notice that part of the thrust of the contestability investigation was a slayer statute problem? Was she ever informed of that? And if not, is there a reason to explain it? I'm not sure it's material but it's certainly something that the defendant has raised.

MR. MAGRATTEN: I'm not aware of any written communication made to -- I mean, from the file I have, I have not seen any written communication to Ms. Ortiz that addresses the slayer statute problem, although I would argue whenever you have an investigation and the beneficiary has been identified as a person of interest, it can't be ruled out. That's always a concern on the part of the insurer. So I think further, the second half of 2013 there were these two things going on.

Number 1, they're still trying to get the medical records which were proving to be extremely difficult to obtain, and at the end of 2013, the beginning of 2014

New York Life essentially says okay, we've tried to get medical records, we can't get medical records, we're not

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

going to get any more criminal records, we've done -we've followed this investigation to the end of its rope and we have no basis to rescind the policy, so we determined that benefits are now payable. The further complication at this point was clearly we have a claim by the primary beneficiary to the policy proceeds. primary beneficiary has been identified as a person of interest. He cannot be ruled out in the investigation of Mr. Kaydea's death. But further there was a telephone conversation between the New York Life's sales agent, the agent who sold this policy, and the secondary beneficiary, Ms. Klah, who I understand is a resident of Pennsylvania. Ms. Klah at that time, according to the sales agent, the telephone conversation, Ms. Klah was very angry. She was distressed, naturally, that her son had died. She was further distressed to learn that a life insurance policy had been taken on his life months before his death. She was in further distress to learn that the primary beneficiary was Ms. Ortiz who Ms. Klah did not particularly care for. Ms. Klah told the New York Life sales agent that she was then speaking to the FBI about the matter, and she did not want to see insurance proceeds paid to anyone. That was the substance of that conversation.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Following that point, New York Life was aware certainly of the possibility of competing claims to the benefit, and then Ms. Klah proceeded to retain counsel in Rhode Island, Mr. Corley, who has not filed an objection to this motion, to these motions. Mr. Corley, in turn, hired an investigator who's been looking into the matter and in response to the interpleader complaint Ms. Klah in fact did file a cross-claim which remains pending by claiming an interest in the death benefits. I think your Honor will probably recall from the Rule 16 conference we had in the matter there was some discussion between beneficiaries trying to reach an agreement to set aside some funds for the minor child, but, apparently those have not progressed any further. So on this basis, New York Life is doing -- trying to accomplish two things: One, leave to permit to deposit the funds in the registry of the court, net of attorney's fee claim of approximately \$12,000. In response to the --THE COURT: Plus whatever interest might be. MR. MAGRATTEN: Yes, and that's a separate issue. Right. THE COURT: MR. MAGRATTEN: That's been briefed and the Court needs to address. In response to the complaint, New

York Life received from Ms. Ortiz a counterclaim of

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

consisting of seven counts, breach of contract, negligence, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, trade practices claim, bad faith. I'm not sure I've named them all but essentially New York Life's position is, that still to their essence, the essential claim of each of these counterclaims is you should have paid me the money alone right away. Your failure to do that has caused me harm. New York Life has cited the Hovis case out of the Third Circuit which discusses the fact that counterclaim relief of that nature is inconsistent with the basic principles of interpleader relief. When an insurer is faced with competing claims or other impediments to paying a benefit it should be allowed to seek interpleader relief and have the Court resolve the issue of who is entitled to funds particularly in a case like this where unfortunately the facts give rise to many issues that need to be addressed. So New York Life would ask that the counterclaims be dismissed as a matter of law. THE COURT: Let me stop you on the Hovis case

THE COURT: Let me stop you on the Hovis case because it's interesting and it certainly -- I mean it appears to be the policy goal that if during the period of contestability the insurance company does a routine investigation, routine being look at all the things that might lead to either the voiding of the policy or some

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

question as to where the policy goes, and then within a reasonable amount of time files an interpleader action as a matter of law counterclaimed by the people who are sued in the interpleader go away without further inquiry. Here is my concern, and it looks like your arguing -- you've kind of got two arguments that the counterclaim goes away. One is sort of a Hovis principle as a matter of law, go no further; and then second, your summary judgment motion says now let's go into the facts, the undisputed facts which appear to be almost entirely undisputed and decide whether or not there is a claim here. And I think your argument is we can stop at level 1 and get rid of this counterclaim. If we have to go on to level 2, it goes away anyway. So here's my question, does Hovis have any outside limits? That is, is the doctrine that's set by Hovis, you know, is there some equitable principle that says that nevertheless -- I mean, in this instance there's clearly -- when you move to the summary judgment standard, I think New York Life has some very good arguments that I'm going to want to hear from Mr. Rodio on as to why its conduct in this instance is reasonable throughout and has enough indicia of good faith and there's no countervailing evidence contrary that you grant summary judgment. But focusing on that first principle, what

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

are the limits of it? So that if the insurance company really is overtly behaving in bad faith yet you have a death within contestability and then a filing of an interpleader, are those two facts the only facts we need to say okay, all counterclaims are gone?

MR. MAGRATTEN: I think I understand where you're going in this.

THE COURT: I hope. Yeah.

And let's take an extreme case. MR. MAGRATTEN: Let's take the case where a life insurer receives a There are issues to be investigated, life claim. insurer determines in year 1 that, yes the benefit is payable but we just can't figure out to whom it should be payable. We should file an interpleader, and then they wait for five years because, hey, we're getting a 6% investment rate of return on this money and we only have to pay out a 1% rate of return so let's just sit on this. And the beneficiaries are screaming and lawyers are writing nasty letters and all sorts of things are happening. I think Hovis and the cases that we cite with Hovis recognize that there may well be -- I mean, this whole concept of interpleader is an equitable remedy, and subject to equitable defenses of laches and other equitable defenses, and clearly Ms. Ortiz has seized upon that in her brief, she's raising laches. Ι

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
think the Court can determine this as a matter of law
because the Court and all parties now have the claim
file, and the claim file shows that as towards the very
end of 2013 when New York Life, despite all of its
efforts, realized we're just not going to get these
medical records. They're not available. And we're not
going to get any more information from Cranston Police
about Mr. Kaydea's criminal history. And the only thing
authorities are telling us is that it's an active
investigation. So we're stuck. It's at that point,
frankly, New York Life contacted me and said, okay, we
need to deposit these funds and we filed the complaint,
I believe it was in January perhaps early February of
2014 we started this process. I think the Court can
determine this from those undisputed facts whether as a
matter of law there's laches here or not. I should
think the legal answer to your question is the remedies
discussed in Hovis are subject to equitable defenses
which is laches.
       THE COURT: Okay. I'd like -- I find the
insurance rate confusing.
       MR. MAGRATTEN: The interest rate?
       THE COURT: Yeah.
                          I'm sorry, yeah, interest
rate.
                       So do I.
      MR. MAGRATTEN:
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: So I would really like to hear a little bit on that.

MR. MAGRATTEN: Candidly, you know, I've been doing this work for years and this is the first time I've heard of this, but --

THE COURT: Yeah, I was struck by the lack of case citations, the cases clarifying how to figure this out.

And it's not because I didn't MR. MAGRATTEN: I think as the Court is well aware, for an insurer to sell a policy in a state like Rhode Island, the form has to be approved and blessed by the insurance department of DBR and any changes to the form has to be reviewed and blessed by DBR, and this presents practical issues to an insurer like New York Life is trying to sell life insurance in fifty different states. process of getting approvals is laborious and is very difficult. So apparently stemming from that difficulty that the industry recognized is an interstate compact to which Rhode Island has subscribed, and the compact basically, as I understand it, the interstate compact has a committee or a board made up of state regulators from a variety of states and they will review policy forms, and once reviewed and approved by this interstate compact those forms can be sold in all the states that

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

subscribe to the compact. It's meant to be an easier way for insurers to access these markets without having to deal with multiple regulators. Rhode Island is a subscriber. This policy sold was based on language that has been approved by the interstate compact. That's on the last page of the policy. There is a statutory provision in Rhode Island laws that basically says that the interstate compact will be the final arbiter of the content. There's a typo and I realize that it originated with my brief and then it was picked up in Ms. Ortiz's brief, not context, content. And to the extent there was a conflict under state law, it's the content of the approved policy form that governs. So here we have the policy form says that the prevailing interest rate shall be set by the insurer depending on the time of death, New York Life, the interest rate that applied at the time of Mr. Kaydea's death was 1%. There's a further provision for additional interest under certain circumstances. We would contend do not apply here. And you're right, unfortunately I did look for case law that talks about this intersection between the interstate compact and conflicting state law. THE COURT: Yeah. So if I understand it right, Rhode Island has a, assuming the scheme is as you've described it, I have no reason to think that it might

not be, Rhode Island has a default rate in its statute of 9% but that your argument is that if the insurer puts a different insurance rate into its policy, and that policy has been approved under the compact, then Rhode Island law says our default rate doesn't apply, instead the policy rate applies, which in this instance the policy simply gives the discretion to New York Life, and New York Life's rate is consistent with treasury rates at the time and not 9%.

MR. MAGRATTEN: Correct.

THE COURT: So it's a substantial difference.

MR. MAGRATTEN: The language basically comes from an approved form by the interstate compact which was the internet reference in my brief. If you go there and look, you'll see the policy form which is what they're using. This is not language that New York Life invented this is the language from the interstate compact.

THE COURT: So the function of the statutory 9% is simply to provide for a default in a situation where the policy is silent.

MR. MAGRATTEN: If the New York Life policy did not address post-mortem interest at all, I think

Ms. Ortiz's argument would be correct that the state statute supplies the law in that circumstance. But here, I mean the Rhode Island statute addresses

specifically what happens when you have a conflict between the terms of the policy and other Rhode Island state law and it provides that the terms of the policy prevail.

THE COURT: I'd also like to hear from you briefly on attorney's fees in a situation like this. The defendant has argued, and I haven't gone deeply enough to have a sense, but sort of has an appealing feel to it that an insurer doesn't get attorney's fees for its sort of normal course of business and that a contestability investigation described by you as undisputedly in this instance, at least at commencement routine, would fall into that category of an insurance company doing its business and that it's not appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion to pay the cost that the insurance company already builds into the premium.

MR. MAGRATTEN: Correct. I mean there is a split of authority on this. The old rule, and still the prevailing rule in most jurisdictions, is in an interpleader case, particularly where the stakeholder itself has done nothing to cause the dispute that brings everyone to court, the stakeholder should be allowed to recover reasonable attorney's fees. There are some decisions, this is a minority view, and it mostly comes

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
out of the west coast jurisdictions, that, Hey this is a
cost of doing business for the life insurer. A certain
number of these claims are going to result in an
interpleader practice, so the insurer should foot the
bill. And there are competing policy arguments here.
                                                       Ι
mean not all interpleaders involve life insurance
            I think the general concept is the
companies.
stakeholder comes to court through no fault of its own.
There's no one suggesting here that New York Life had
anything to do with Mr. Kaydea's demise or the reasons
why he designated beneficiaries the way he did or the
reasons why Cranston authorities or Rhode Island
Attorney General's office cannot move along quicker in
its investigations, and for those reasons it's unfair to
tax New York Life with basically my fees for having to
come to court to ask for leave to deposit the policy
benefit.
          But there is a countervailing policy view --
       THE COURT: Is there any law addressing the issue
in the circuit, in our circuit?
       MR. MAGRATTEN:
                       I think in our motion we do cite
several First Circuit cases.
       THE COURT:
                   Okay.
       MR. MAGRATTEN:
                       There's certainly First Circuit
precedent for awarding attorney's fees in --
       THE COURT: If it's in your brief, I'll find it.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. MAGRATTEN: I believe it is. But we cite the Sun Life Insurance case which is First Circuit 2009 affirming an award of about \$8,600 in attorney's fees, an interpleader case involving 48,000 in insurance There's a Smith Barney Harris case, District proceeds. of Mass, 1994, and Foxboro Savings Bank case, District of Massachusetts, 1999. Yeah, there is authority within the First Circuit for (inaudible). And the other, you'll see in the order that we propose, part of interpleader relief is that New York Life would be deemed upon depositing the funds with the registry of the court, New York Life would be deemed to have fully performed its obligation under the policy, the remaining parties would be enjoined from prosecuting any claim to those fees anywhere outside of this legal action, so the idea is once New York Life has deposited the money it is dismissed from the action, and the parties can, of course, subpoena information from New York Life if they need additional documents or need to depose anybody but there's no need really for New York Life to remain in the case for that. THE COURT: All right, good. Mr. Magratten. MR. MAGRATTEN: One footnote --THE COURT: Oh, sorry.

MR. MAGRATTEN: I'm sorry, one footnote I need to 1 2 add. 3 THE COURT: Yes. MR. MAGRATTEN: I was on the phone this morning 4 with Clare Parvin, the financial officer for the Court, 5 and according to Claire the funds can be deposited in 6 7 one of two ways. The easy way is to just cash deposit 8 into the registry of the court, non interest accruing account, and the order we've prepared would allow just 9 10 that. If the parties want the funds deposited into an interest bearing account, that under local rules 11 12 requires special language in the order and Claire sent 13 out a warning that if that's the road the parties want to go down to the prevailing interest rates right now 14 are very low and there's a fee that goes to setting up 15 16 that kind of account. So economically it may not make 17 good sense to go down that road. 18 THE COURT: All right, good. Thank you. All 19 right, Mr. Rodio, Ms. Felix. 20 MR. RODIO: Good morning, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Good morning. 22

MR. RODIO: Before I begin I want to thank the Court for accommodating our CLE schedule last week and rescheduling this hearing. I'm not sure we're any smarter but we do have six or eight for credits.

23

24

25

THE COURT: Thank God for that. Everybody is good to go for another year.

MR. RODIO: Your Honor asked a question about the equitable nature of interpleader and we've cited a case, we just dug it out, back from 1957 but it's still a good case out of the District Court in New York, American Wine Steamship Company vs Bowering & Company, and there the Court notes very clearly that it's well established that the remedy of interpleader is equitable in nature and is governed by equitable principles. And the federal interpleader act did not do anything to change the equitable nature of an interpleader action.

I think, given that, and I think, and maybe I'll regret saying this but it really seems like a rather straight forward and almost intuitive legal analysis when you're discussing interpleader, and particularly when you put it in the nature of an equitable proceeding. You have an innocent stakeholder who through no fault of their own finds themselves with two legitimate competing claims to a fund. They've do not claim any interest in that fund, and they should not be penalized by choosing one or the other.

In order to make those determinations, though, one needs to bore down into the facts of the case in order to determine, one, whether this is a completely innocent

Stakeholder one needs to bore down into the facts, and Mr. Magratten to his credit makes a very nice superficial argument, I think, oh, we investigation and contestability period and health records, et cetera, et cetera, but what I'd like to do is bore down into those issues a little bit and let's see how reasonable New York Life's actions have been.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Rodio, let me just sort of stop you there and give you my concern about your argument, and that is that if the doctrine of laches tells an insurance company that they've got to make a decision and pay in a situation where there is an ongoing murder investigation, in effect the Court would be saying that equitable principles require that the clever murderer be paid because the clever murderer has covered up the tracks well enough that the investigation takes longer than the legal laches pressure on the insurer to just make a payment.

MR. RODIO: Sure.

THE COURT: It doesn't seem to me that's consistent with equity.

MR. RODIO: And I completely understand that question, and I struggled with it myself, and the conclusion I've come to is we don't need to answer that in this case because it has been 16 months, your Honor.

This didn't happen a month ago or two months ago or six months ago. That's the first answer to that. There is some period of time when an unsolved murder does not allow an insurance company to hold on to a quarter of a million dollars that doesn't belong to it. What that precise amount of time is, I don't know and I'm glad I don't have to answer it in that case, but I think 16 months is fair enough.

THE COURT: And I want to throw out the facts that have grabbed me as I've looked at the papers, and I must say I've looked at things what I would call very superficially. I've been through, I think, all of your papers. I've looked at some of the cases but I may have missed things, I may have focused on the wrong things, so that's why I want you to know what I'm thinking. A couple of things that really strike me, first of all, the period isn't the 16 months, it's really just right up until the interpleader, and the interpleader is initiated less than a year after the murder, if I've got it right.

The second thing is that the police tell the insurance company that your client is a person of interest right out of the box, according to my notes within a week of the receipt of the claim by your client. I think somewhere in the file the police said

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

to New York Life, tell us if you're going to pay that beneficiary these proceeds, that's got to send a red flag up flying, then not very much time passes, it's like basically we get through the summer and now they've got the decedent's mom in the mix talking about don't pay her, and then in September 6th, so we're still in a pretty short timeline from the date of death, less than six months, the police tell New York Life that they're really hopeful that the investigation is going to close in on somebody, and possibly even in as little as a So for the insurance company to kind of hang tight for another, I think, three months until the insurance company hears from you, we're, you know, times up, we're going to start to really put you under pressure, and the insurance company looks at everything on the radar screen that they've been able to get, and all the things they haven't been able to get, and kind of bottom lines it, I'm struggling to see any laches in there. MR. RODIO: On a pure laches analysis, I think that's a fair summary, your Honor, with one, I think, very significant exception, the police never mentioned my client as a person of interest. The police said --THE COURT: Well they said beneficiary.

MR. RODIO: -- family and beneficiaries --

1 THE COURT: But she's the beneficiary. 2 -- have not been ruled out which --MR. RODIO: 3 THE COURT: Right. MR. RODIO: -- I mean, what does one expect, them 4 to say, your Honor? If Mr. Corley were here I think 5 he'd tell us he would have a field day if the police 6 7 started ruling people out before somebody was charged 8 and then later went back and changed their minds. think police procedure, and I'm certainly not, you know, 9 10 I spent a little time in the Attorney General's office but that was long ago, but police procedure from a 11 12 common sense point of view is that you don't rule 13 anybody out unless and until somebody's been charged with a crime. So the fact that my client wasn't ruled 14 out, the fact that other family members weren't ruled 15 16 out, it doesn't strike me as being all that significant. 17 Of course they weren't ruled out unless and until they 18 have specific leads. Not even specific leads. Unless 19 and until they've charged somebody with a crime.

would just have a field day with that. It's almost per

they later change their mind, somebody like Mr. Corley

you imagine if the police went on record and said, oh,

we're ruling out this person or that person, and then

24 se reasonable doubt.

20

21

22

23

25

THE COURT: Well, no question. But if I look at

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

what New York Life knew within, as its early stages of its investigation are proceeding, it's just hard to call it unreasonable at a level that, you know, kind of starts to trigger bad faith because the insurance company, first of all, is aware from your client tells them that she wasn't on speaking terms with the decedent at the time of his death, insurance policies with death within contestability just raise red flags all over the place, and then you've got a murder, and then you've got somebody who supposedly has an insurable interest according to the policy application, not on speaking terms and unable to procure medical records for a person with whom she supposedly had an insurable interest. Ι mean, right there, and the police say the beneficiary of the policy is a person of interest? How does that not put the insurance company into the precise quandary that is the paradynamic interpleader situation which you began at the outset by saying, of course, in that situation there's no issue. MR. RODIO: Understood, and that's why I concede

MR. RODIO: Understood, and that's why I concede that as a matter of a pure laches analysis I think the insurance company has a good argument. I think they waited too long even under a pure laches analysis. I think once that statement was made to them they say, okay, these are not our funds. This could be a slayer.

```
1
    And I'll get to that in a moment because --
2
           THE COURT: Yes, but at what point -- is your
    argument that they should have initiated the
3
4
    interpleader earlier?
5
           MR. RODIO: That's one of my arguments. My other
    argument is --
6
7
           THE COURT:
                       Tell me when.
8
           MR. RODIO: -- they should not have strung my
    client along with lies for close to a year.
9
10
           THE COURT:
                       This is the medical record issue.
                       This is the whole issue of --
11
           MR. RODIO:
12
           THE COURT: Let's focus on the first thing --
13
           MR. RODIO: Okay.
           THE COURT: -- which is when do you contend did
14
    the delay in bringing the interpleader move into the
15
16
    laches zone? When should they have filed it?
17
           MR. RODIO: It's hard to separate the laches out
    from the other of bad faith or inequitable conduct.
18
                                                          But
19
    assuming there was no other inequitable conduct,
20
    assuming they weren't telling her one thing and doing
21
    another, it would seem to me that three months for an
22
    unsolved murder is long enough for an insurance company
23
    to say we don't know what to do in this instance.
24
    we looked for cases, your Honor, on this and there are
25
    none.
```

THE COURT: Yeah, that's what I was going to say, are there any cases that say how long you float with an unsolved murder before you have to do something?

MR. RODIO: I'm not the best researcher in the world but we couldn't find anything. But, yeah, and that is the issue, I suppose. I would make this argument, though, under the Rhode Island statute a slayer is someone who is responsible for the wrongful death of another. I don't think it's up to the insurance company to make a determination of what would happen in the future, and I think if the insurance company paid the proceeds out after a reasonable period of time, and I'll suggest three months, to someone who it was later found out was the slayer, I think the insurance company is protected. I don't think the insurance company is protected. I don't think the

THE COURT: I don't know.

MR. RODIO: I don't think the insurance company is bound by hindsight. I think the insurance company -- but be that as it may, after three months we don't know who the killer is. We don't claim any interest in these funds. We're giving our beneficiary, our insured's beneficiary, a straight story which didn't happen here. Let's just put these funds into interpleader. The facts of this case are almost the polar opposite of that.

Number 1, oh, it's a contestability period, and your Honor's mentioned that a lot, and it really -- I don't think co-inflates with this issue of the slayer statute at all. Whether Mr. Kaydea was murdered, when he was or whether he was murdered ten years after that policy went into effect --

THE COURT: Slayer is going to apply no matter what.

MR. RODIO: The slayer is going to apply whether we're in the contestability period or not. So those two things really are separate in my mind. They used the contestability period to essentially put her off, hold off, hold off, give us this -- and we showed you in the papers ten separate requests for medical records. We showed the Court in the papers an affirmative representation "you're the sole beneficiary". The only thing that's missing are the medical records, so go get the medical records. So what does this poor girl do? She hires a lawyer who for reasons I can't fathom, tries to open a probate estate for the decedent, is spectacularly unsuccessful, at some expense, some great expense to her considering her means.

THE COURT: Yeah. Let me stop there. You're actually right that the interpleader based on the slayer statute isn't linked to the contestability period. What

the contestability period allows the insurance company to do is to search for suggestions of reasons why the policy is void.

MR. RODIO: Exactly.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: And it seems to me, and Mr. Magratten has suggested a couple of hypotheticals, and I can think of about 50 more, that there are lots of reasons why someone whose death certificate says, you know, murder, might nevertheless present a policy that's void and that the kind of documentation that the insurance company is looking for are not just standard in every contestability investigation but also are the kinds of documents that might very well expose either a health issue or something that's revealed to a caretaker, a medical caretaker, and that's reflected in notes, that demonstrates some voidability issue that is what is the focus of the insurance company, and for whatever reason the insurance company got to January of 2014 and said we've done enough, we're satisfied that there isn't a voidability problem with this, all we've got is the slayer statute, and therefore we're going to interplead it. But it just seems to me that every single time there's a death in the contestability period insurance companies always do an investigation that involves a survey of the medical records, and at the getgo they

don't know that your client can't procure them. They're insuring -- they're assuming they've got someone with an insurable interest who was identified in the policy as about to become a wife, I think it said soon to be spouse or something.

MR. RODIO: Intended spouse.

THE COURT: Yes, and so they make a routine request, and she doesn't come back and say, oh, you know, this is a guy I only kind of had a very short relationship with and I'm not even speaking to him, and I have nothing to do with him, and I'm not going to be able to procure his medical records. She didn't say that, right? So that attorney --

MR. RODIO: There's no record of that.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. RODIO: I'm not exactly sure of what her lawyer said but certainly the insurance company was aware that she was forced to open a probate because she didn't have access to those with HIPA and all that now-a-days.

THE COURT: But if she had been a common law wife she would likely have been successful in opening. The insurance company didn't know that. So I'm really struggling to see how the request for medical records, which is such a normal expected thing to do as part of

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
the contestability period investigation, rises to the
level of bad faith, because I think that's your
argument.
       MR. RODIO: I respectfully disagree with your
Honor. I don't think it is a normal and expected thing.
If I buy an insurance policy today, and tomorrow I
perish in a car accident, my medical records --
       THE COURT:
                   They're going to get the same letter.
                  -- are irrelevant.
       MR. RODIO:
       THE COURT:
                  No.
                        I think the same letter that
went out, I think -- and I may be wrong, I'll ask
Mr. Magratten --
       MR. RODIO: Well, it could be but let's define
what a contestability period is. A contestability
period is a period of time, in this case two years, I
think, where the insurance company can void the
insurance based upon misrepresentations in the
application. That's what a contestability period is.
       THE COURT: Correct.
       MR. RODIO: It's not, oh, we found something we
didn't know about you or, you know, we shouldn't have
written this insurance for some reason. It is -- there
is a misrepresentation in the application and that
misrepresentation is connected to your cause of death.
       THE COURT: Correct.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. RODIO: So there's no way to analyze this without looking at the application, and that's what I have in front of me, your Honor. First of all, with regard to medical records, Mr. Magratten gave -- because I tried to think of examples myself. Mr. Magratten gave an example, oh, suppose he'd been stabbed five times in the past. But they didn't ask that. There's nothing in this medical questionnaire --

THE COURT: They ask about his criminal experience.

MR. RODIO: Well, I'm going to get to that, but if I could just let me go through very briefly the medical questions. Do you have high blood pressure. How does that relate to being murdered? Do you have sugar or diabetes? Do you have shortness of breath? Do you have cancer, tumor, ulcer? Do you have multiple sclerosis? Do you smoke? Do you have a kidney disorder? No, no, no. Do you have muscle weakness? Have you been diagnosed with AIDS? Do you have chest pressure? Have you had surgery? Your spouses and natural parents, have they suffered angina, heart disorder, stroke, diabetes, cancer? One can look at this closely, and I have, and there's nothing in this medical questionnaire that would relate in any way to a person being murdered. So as my starting point here is

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
medical records are irrelevant. Any -- particularly
we're -- I'm an amateur at this. Mr. Magratten is a
heck of a lot better than me. But an insurance
professional saying I want to know if this policy is
contestable based upon medical misrepresentations, we'll
look at this and would say none of these things relate
to murder. Let's suppose he did have shortness of
breath or chronic bronchitis, how would that relate to
his being murdered? It wouldn't. So I think an
insurance professional, a reasonable insurance
professional, looking at this would say medical records
are irrelevant. We're in the contestability period,
yes, but medical records mean nothing in this case. And
having looked at it now, I believe they mean nothing.
   Now, the only -- and just for the record, I'm
referencing page New York Life 0018 in the record,
that's the medical questionnaire, and the only other
part of the --
       THE COURT: One question, Mr. Rodio, I'm
assuming, and it's probably in the record and I just
didn't find it yet, that the death certificate was part
of what your client provided in connection with her
claim?
       MR. RODIO: That's right.
       THE COURT: And that the death certificate shows
```

that the cause of death was murder?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. RODIO: Homicide. Strangulation by ligature is the way it's put.

THE COURT: I assumed that was in there somewhere but I hadn't found it.

MR. RODIO: So the other, and Mr. Magratten may correct me when he gets up, but the only other potential misrepresentation in the application, and the application I'll just say for the record is New York Life, and they put it in first, to their credit, because it is the most important thing, New York Life 001 through -- well, my copy is cut off, I think it's 0020. That's the entire application. The only other page that I found that is even potentially relevant to a contestability investigation is page 007, and that is, and your Honor correctly pointed out, that's a question, have you pled guilty to or been convicted of or been imprisoned for any felony or misdemeanor, or are there any such charges currently pending. I concede that a misrepresentation on that question could potentially implicate contestability in this case. I also know from experience that one could get an answer to this question, if not in 15 minutes certainly in a day. experienced investigator can get a BCI on someone, an experienced -- I can go on the computer, anyone can go

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

on the computer and see if there are pending charges against anyone. That literally, well not literally, but I think that's a one hour investigation. It's certainly not a one year investigation. That's the only other portion of this application that I can find, not the only other portion, the only portion of this application that I could find that remotely could implicate contestability. These are insurance professionals, your Honor. They know what they're looking for. Is there a misstatement in this policy that led to this death that essentially tricked us into insuring him, right? That's what contestability is all about. And I think an insurance professional looking at this would say, well, let's check whether he's been in prison for a felony or misdemeanor, or whether there's any charges currently pending, but that's the only potential investigation they needed to do here, and that certainly didn't take 12 months, or 11 and 1/2 months, however long it came for this interpleader. Which brings me, I guess, maybe to the summary judgment argument. I don't think that it is fair to rule as a matter of law that this investigation -- the details of which New York Life has only given us the broadest outline of, that this investigation was

reasonable and necessary and went on for a period of

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

time that was required in order to do that. In fact, if I were a factfinder, we're not here to find facts, but if I were a factfinder, I think I would find exactly the opposite. I think I would find five minutes with the medical questionnaire and a reasonable insurance professional would say that's irrelevant, and then ten minutes looking up databases for felony or misdemeanor convictions, and there's your contestability investigation it's done.

Now, the second issue in whether -- in terms of whether it's fair to find as a matter of law is can, or should, the Court find as a matter of law that an insurance company that essentially misleads a beneficiary into believing that the only reason they're not being paid their benefits are irrelevant medical records is it fair to conclude as a matter of law that that is not actionable? I don't think it is. I don't think it is. I think to get back to your Honor's original question, I think if New York Life had, and there are ways to do this without offending anyone, but if New York Life had informed Ms. Ortiz that this was an unsolved murder, and that there were certain legal prohibitions to paying claims with regard to an unsolved murder, when the murderer had not been apprehended, I think that would be reasonable, and I think if that

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

representation went on for two, or three, or four months, I think that would be reasonable, as well. I think what's unreasonable is to tell her something completely different than that. And your Honor asked when she found out about the slayer statute, I'm not the smartest person in the world, and I don't this that often, but I can tell you the first time I found out because I was befuddled as to why they weren't paying this claim. It's when I got, or when Mr. Magratten called me and told me that he would be filing an interpleader and I said what's the deal? And he said slayer statute, and that's when the lights went on in my head. So I had no idea, and I've been with this case two or three or four months at that point -- well, not four months, but I'd been with this case certainly a sufficient period of time that maybe I should have thought of that, but I had no idea. Certainly my client had no idea that the slayer statute was involved in any way in this. We're thinking medical records, and then we're thinking, well now we've put their feet to the fire, we've showed them that medical records are irrelevant, now they're going to file an interpleader. Why? What's it all about? So that's when slayer statute comes into the picture, and that's when this really tragic statement from the decedent's mother, I

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

quess, comes into the picture. Of course we didn't know about that, either. And the question there is, as a matter of law, can the Court say that a distraught mother, and anyone who's a parent, I mean, your heart just goes out to this woman, but can the Court say as a matter of law that a distraught mother saying no one's going to benefit from the death of my son, does that create a sufficient legal issue such that interpleader is required. I don't think it does. I don't think there's any cognizable claim that the decedent's mother has to this insurance policy unless, and it's circles right back to the slayer statute, unless my client's a slayer. So the fact that the mother said this, it's dramatic, it's heart-wrenching, but legally, I don't think it means anything. I don't think it means anything. The policy could not be clearer. If you're the first beneficiary, we'll pay you as long as you're living. If you're not living, we'll pay the second, third, fourth, beneficiary. I mean that's -- it couldn't be clearer. THE COURT: Mr. Rodio, a question on a point you

THE COURT: Mr. Rodio, a question on a point you made a moment ago, and I'm focusing on the insurance company's admitted failure to advise your client that the slayer statute was in play until they finished their contestability investigation, probably pushed to finish

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

it by your demand letter. Are there any cases saying that an insurance company has an affirmative duty to advise a beneficiary if there is a question, either a specific question under a slayer's statute -- I guess I have some concerns about saying to someone who the police are telling you is under investigation for murder that you, the insurer, are suspicious that the person is under investigation for murder, that there's a period of time where the insurance company hoping that the police will close the file and arrest somebody else, are reluctant to say to their -- the beneficiary, their insured, we think you're a murderer and there's -- you know, if she really is the murderer, there's a clear downside to saying that. If she's really not the murderer, there's a clear downside to saying that. that therefore with the police actively investigating and saying, as they did in September, hang on, we think we're going to solve this, is there a duty, and are there any cases that talk about the duty that the insurance company finds itself in? I'm, you know, just looking factually at the situation New York Life found itself in. I'm finding it hard to criticize them for not believing at some point prior to the filing of the interpleader we have a duty to tell this lady that the slayer statute is either, as you would argue, the only

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

reason for our delay or, as they would argue, moving in tandem with our contestability investigation, and only when the first, the second one runs out, and ends, do we then have no choice but to go public with that accusation? But I'm uncomfortable with saying that an insurance company has an affirmative obligation to alert the beneficiary in those circumstances.

MR. RODIO: Yeah, and I completely understand, and that's why I thought that -- that's why I mention that I think there are sensitive artful ways of saying I don't know if the insurance company has an affirmative duty to say that, we'll look that up, but here's what I do know, the insurance company has an affirmative duty not to misrepresent to her the reason it's not paying, and that's where we're coming from here, both as a purely legal matter, the insurance company makes a representation, that representation is false, she relies upon that false representation, she goes out and spends money and takes time in reasonable reliance. That's a pure legal misrepresentation claim. On the equitable side of things, getting back to the initial point I made interpleader is an equitable action, is it equitable to not just not affirmatively represent why you're not paying, but to misrepresent why you're not paying --

THE COURT: Yeah. So, in other words, you're saying there's a factual dispute here as to whether or not this insurance company five minutes into their contestability investigation knew there's no voidability thing here.

MR. RODIO: Yeah, and --

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: We're in slayer statute mode and we got to lie to the beneficiary to sort of hold the status quo until we can figure out what to do.

MR. RODIO: I think they've confirmed that. They didn't get any medical records. They didn't get any more criminal records, not that they've told us, at least, and now they're willing to pay. So they got none of the information that withheld payment, supposedly withheld payment for a year, but now they're prepared to pay. I think -- here's what I think, and it's speculation but it's useable speculation, I think they got my letter. They said: Oh, my God, there's a Rhode Island statute that doesn't allow us to void the policy for any misrepresentation, what are we going to do now? And that's when they came up with this interpleader in this supposed contest for the funds. I think until that point, I think they were just stalling or looking for some misrepresentation unrelated to the manner of his death that could lead them to not pay under the policy,

which gets me back to his mom's statement that no one's going to profit from my son's death. I mean, the sad irony here is that the insurance company is the only one that's profited. No one would argue that having a quarter million dollars in a bank account for the last 18 months is not a financial benefit. So the insurance company is the one that's profited thus far based upon this case.

THE COURT: Well, the insurance company, I think, would probably say no, by the time you're done with attorney's fees and interest, unless I award them their fees, it's truly a wash for them.

MR. RODIO: Well, yeah, and one would hope -THE COURT: Once they put it into interpleader
then I don't think the argument that the insurance
company has benefited works all that well.

MR. RODIO: Yeah, if the Court permits them to put it into interpleader, which we resist because we think that all that does is it cuts off the interest obligation and it insulates them from further interest liability for their wrongful actions. So that's why we're resisting interpleader. There's no real contest to this fund, your Honor. There's no real contest. If the Court makes the ruling that, listen 16 months is long enough, because there's no magic to it, 16 months

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

isn't long enough, is 18, is 24, is 38? I mean, we don't know. But I think it's reasonable to conclude that 16 months is long enough. If 16 months is long enough, these funds shouldn't go to interpleader, they should go to Ms. Ortiz who's the beneficiary of this policy. So that's where we are on this interpleader We don't want the insurance company to have the action. benefit of putting -- we are in a obviously very low interest rate environment, and maybe it doesn't even make sense to put it into an interest bearing account. But we don't think the insurance company should have that benefit because of its interpleader action. Had it done so, had it filed this interpleader in a couple, three, four, five months, I won't be taking this position. Had it not misrepresented to her the reason it wasn't paying her, I wouldn't be taking this position. But this is a very different case. It's a very different case from the one that -- actually, it's been an interesting legal research because you don't very often to get to read about murders and things like that. I don't know if your Honor saw that Judge Posner case that there was a Nicole Kidman movie To Die For and she had teenagers murder her husband. It sounds exactly -- that Judge Posner case sounds exactly like that, wife has an 18 year old and two 16 year old accomplices

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

murder her husband and then she's not entitled -- of course she was a convicted murderer at the time the Court made its decision so it's really not applicable to this case, but the question becomes who then takes the insurance policy. But Hovis, I mean Hovis doesn't help the insurance company at all here. Hovis is a case where an insurance salesman sells an elderly widow a policy, two years later goes back to his company, when she's on her deathbed and says she wants to add me as a beneficiary, there's an internal investigation because they don't allow their salesmen to get on policies unless there's approval, she dies while the investigation is going on, it's later approved, and then there's an issue of was it really her signature. can't tell because she was so old and elderly. I mean, those are compelling facts for an interpleader. didn't pay this lady and didn't tell her why, in fact misrepresented why for a year, and now we have a different theory, those are not compelling facts for an interpleader. THE COURT: Yeah. I'll tell you candidly,

THE COURT: Yeah. I'll tell you candidly,

Mr. Rodio, I find this is a good interpleader case so

that the real thing that's of concern to me is whether

there's a period of time where the insurance company

knows there's no voidability issues yet the police are

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

stringing them along on the investigation, making them think we're going to close this investigation, which would give clarity, eliminate the problem. So they delay for a period of time where they're no longer really worried about contestability. That period is fairly short, so really does it really get us into the laches zone? And then they file the interpleader. hard for me to -- I'm going to do a deep dive and I want to go read all the cases, and I may change my mind on this, but my reaction at the moment is that this is a paradynamic interpleader situation with enough evidence that the slayer statute may ultimately be found appropriate as to your client, and a secondary beneficiary very passionate about those issues. I don't see that the insurance company had any choice. I mean, I don't think one of the reasonable choices on the table for the insurance company was pay the policy to Ms. Ortiz. So the real issue is, what's the legal significance of a factual dispute regarding whether at some point the contestability investigation was really petering out and yet they don't initiate the interpleader because the police are telling them we're going to solve it. MR. RODIO: Well, understood, your Honor, and the only point I would make to that is if the Court does

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
allow the interpleader that does not mean that the seven
counts that we've raised, for breach of contract, bad
faith, et cetera, et cetera, go away.
                                       That does not
implicate the interpleaded fund. Those are separate and
apart from the interpleaded funds, so I'm not sure how
       THE COURT:
                   Yeah --
       MR. RODIO: -- I'm not sure how New York Life
reaches that far in this case.
       THE COURT:
                   Okay.
                   Thank you, your Honor.
       MR. RODIO:
                  All right, thank you. I think
       THE COURT:
Mr. Magratten will be seeking what might be the last
word, maybe not?
                       Just briefly, your Honor.
       MR. MAGRATTEN:
Ms. Ortiz is advancing the argument that it was obvious
the medical records was a red-herring here.
                                             But I think
the -- what the handicap that the Court and all the
parties are operating under is we just don't know the
circumstances of death. You can envision a
hypothetical, for example, where Mr. Kaydea died in a
drug deal gone bad, and one of the questions, medical
questions is do you have any history of drug abuse, have
you taken any illicit medication -- any illicit drugs,
and he said no. Medical records intending to show a
```

history of drug abuse could be quite relevant to this, and support a policy recision. So I think it's an overstatement to say that medical records here, the search for medical records was completely immaterial.

Mr. Rodio said, and I think this is an important point to clarify, Mr. Rodio said that to date the insurance company has only given the broadest outline of its investigation. As part of New York Life's Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures, New York Life has provided its complete file on this. In a privilege log, there's some attorney/client information in there that was redacted but basically all parties now, and it's all -- the complete file is attached to the motion papers so the Court and all parties have New York Life's complete file on this. The only additional information that could be obtained about the investigation will be perhaps the interviews or depositions of the investigator or New York Life's staff.

And, finally, there's been this argument about a misrepresentation that at some point New York Life told Ms. Ortiz the only reason we're not paying you is you haven't given us medical records yet. But I think if the Court looks, and the file contains the actual correspondence, I'm looking at a June 4 letter from New York Life to Ms. Ortiz. What New York Life says is: We

are writing regarding the pending death claim under the above-captioned policy. We are in the process of conducting inquiries that include obtaining copies of the insured's medical records from the doctors and hospitals that treated the insured. As soon as our inquiries are completed, you will be hearing from us further regarding the matter. I think it's a stretch to infer from that language that New York Life is telling her, Look, the only reason you're not being paid is you haven't given us medical records. They cite that as one of the things they're looking at. But that's -- I don't think that supports the misrepresentation.

THE COURT: One question, Mr. Magratten. If this were a situation where we weren't in the contestability period, but New York Life gets the death certificate and goes, oh, murder, makes a phone call to the police and learns that the beneficiary they're about to cut the check to is a person of interest in connection with the murder investigation, but you're not in the contestability period, how long does the insurance company have to initiate an interpleader proceeding without being tagged with laches?

MR. MAGRATTEN: I would argue that the relevant issue there is not so much time but activity. I would argue that the burden then falls on the insurer to

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

maintain contact with authorities, gather as much information about the case implicating the beneficiary in the murder, and as long as there's reasonable hope that more information is coming, that there will be an arrest, or that there won't be an arrest, or that the beneficiary is going to be exculpated, I think the problem would lie where you have a life insured that's doing nothing and just waiting for the police department to call and say, okay, you can cut the check. think as you look through the claim file you'll see there's a fairly steady stream of activity through the spring of 2013 into early 2014, frequent contact with investigators. They're reaching out -- unfortunately they're just getting the same line which is it's a very active investigation, it's ongoing, no one can be ruled out. I think in the backdrop to the original statement from investigators, or from the authorities, that Ms. Ortiz was a person of interest, I think New York Life, or any insurer in that situation, acts reasonably not to pay the claim immediately to see how the investigation turns out. THE COURT: All right, thank you. MR. RODIO: Can I just make one point? THE COURT: Yeah, I was going to give you --MR. RODIO: Oh, thank you.

THE COURT: -- the real last word, and I also had a couple of minor questions for you, so --

MR. RODIO: Yeah. I just did want to point out that Ms. Ortiz's affidavit, at paragraph 13, says beginning in May of 2013 New York Life repeatedly informed both me and my attorney that it needed medical records, I'm paraphrasing at this point, before it could pay me death benefits. And then the very next paragraph, 14, uncontested. Before filing this suit, New York Life stated no other reason for refusing to pay me the policy benefits. So that is on the record, your Honor. I just wanted to point that out.

THE COURT: Okay. Don't sit down. The undisputed fact regarding the routine nature of the investigation, what I said at the beginning to Mr. Magratten is that, and would you agree that this is what's undisputed, that the very first letter that went to your client, I think May 2nd of 2013, which appears to me to be a routine contestability period letter, that says sorry for the loss, obviously they have no idea that this lady hasn't lost anything. She's no longer even in contact with this guy, so it looks like a routine letter, and then the investigation moves, and I think Mr. Magratten agrees that it becomes non-routine later in the investigation. So I think your factual

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
dispute with regard to that word routine, my question is
whether you would agree that it's undisputed that at
least as of
May 2 of 2013 this was routine.
       MR. RODIO: Yeah, I think that's a question
for -- probably, but I do think that's a question for an
industry expert. If and when this case goes to trial, I
expect that we'll put somebody on the stand to say this
is how these matters are typically handled within the
industry, and I expect that that person will say, you
know, within a month, whatever it was, quote/unquote,
routine, it should have been very evident to New York
Life that it was no longer routine.
                          I mean clearly that's
       THE COURT: Yeah.
disputed.
       MR. RODIO: Right.
       THE COURT: But that that initial, you know,
three days after your client had contacted them --
       MR. RODIO: Yeah, I don't think you can fault
them.
       THE COURT: -- it's routine.
                   I don't think you can fault them.
       MR. RODIO:
       THE COURT:
                  And here's my other question.
                                                  If the
Court, if I recommend the interpleader, I want to make
sure that I deal with the interest bearing versus
```

non-interest bearing issue. From your client's perspective, would you, if we get to that point, and that's the recommendation that I make, would you want me to recommend that before a final order is entered the Court give you the opportunity to make a decision as to whether or not it goes to interest bearing with fees that may wipe out the interest or that it go straight into Claire Parvin's account and does not carry interest?

MR. RODIO: Yes, we would appreciate that opportunity. Or, and I don't even know if this is within the Court's purview, but or an opportunity to put the funds in a joint account at Merrill Lynch or at Fleet National Bank, requiring signatures of all the parties to remove it where maybe the fees wouldn't be the same and maybe there would be a little more interest I don't know.

THE COURT: Yeah, I don't -- Mr. Magratten you may know whether that's something that works in the world of interpleader.

MR. MAGRATTEN: I think that's a little outside the usual interpleader box.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MAGRATTEN: I can tell you, I think New York
Life would prefer not to go down that road. That would

```
1
    require it to have an attorney involved, signing off on
2
    documents and --
3
           THE COURT: And more expense.
4
           MR. MAGRATTEN: Paperwork and more expense, yes.
5
           THE COURT:
                       Yeah.
                              All right.
           MR. RODIO: Although we hope Mr. Magratten stays
6
7
    with us, your Honor.
           THE COURT: Well, I understand that. And he
8
    hopes he doesn't. And I can't tell you one way or the
9
10
    other because we will take this under advisement.
    Frankly I think Judge McConnell recently published a
11
12
    decision in the insurance context that said who said
13
    insurance law is boring. I think this case illustrates
14
    that point, perhaps even more so. So I will be taking
    this under advisement. It will take me some time
15
16
    because I want to really go deeply into the facts, map
    them out and look at all of the cases you've cited and
17
18
    probably do some research of our own. But we'll try to
19
    get you a decision within a reasonable period of time.
20
           MR. RODIO: Thank you, your Honor.
21
           MR. MAGRATTEN:
                           Thank you, your Honor.
22
           THE COURT: All right, Court will be in recess.
23
    (RECESS)
24
25
```

```
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
                CERTIFICATE
10
11
12
    I, court-approved transcriber, certify that the
13
    foregoing is a correct transcript from the official
    electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the
14
    above-entitled matter.
15
16
17
18
19
    /s/JOSEPH A. FONTES
20
    COURT REPORTER
21
22
    NOVEMBER 4, 2014
23
24
25
```